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ABSTRACT
In this paper, using a significantly improved version of the model-independent, cos-
mographic approach to cosmology (John, M. V. 2004, ApJ, 614, 1), we address an
important question: Was there a decelerating past for the universe? To answer this,
the Bayes’s probability theory is employed, which is the most appropriate tool for
quantifying our knowledge when it changes through the acquisition of new data. The
cosmographic approach helps to sort out the models in which the universe was always
accelerating from those in which it decelerated for at least some time in the period
of interest. Bayesian model comparison technique is used to discriminate these rival
hypotheses with the aid of recent releases of supernova data. We also attempt to pro-
vide and improve another example of Bayesian model comparison, performed between
some Friedmann models, using the same data. Our conclusion, which is consistent with
other approaches, is that the apparent magnitude-redshift data alone cannot discrimi-
nate these competing hypotheses. We also argue that the lessons learnt using Bayesian
theory are extremely valuable to avoid frequent U-turns in cosmology.
Subject headings: cosmology: observations - cosmology: theory - supernova: general -
cosmography - accelerating universe - Bayesian model comparison
1. INTRODUCTION
It is usual in cosmology that when new data come in, we need to readjust our parameter
values or shall even attempt to modify our theoretical model itself. But each time while doing so,
we are guided by our knowledge gathered so far about the universe. This kind of gradual learning
is characteristic of sciences like cosmology, where one cannot conduct laboratory experiments.
A very interesting turn of events which unfolded in cosmology in the past ten years exemplifies
this learning process. Till the early 1990s, a Friedmann cosmological model with either radiation
or dust as energy component was conceived to be the standard model in cosmology and it was
generally believed that this standard model described the observed universe (at least from the time
of nucleosynthesis) to a very good accuracy. Most of the widely discussed cosmological problems,
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which ought to have surfaced in the classical epoch, were known to disappear when we incorporate
into the standard model the theory of inflation, which envisages a flat universe. The value of the
Hubble parameter H0 ≡ 100h km s
−1 Mpc−1 quoted during that period was 0.4 < h < 1 (Kolb &
Turner 1990). There was no serious age problem and no real need for a cosmological constant Λ
in the late universe. The beginning of the present phase of Λ-term or dark energy (Padmanabhan
2003; Peebles & Ratra 2003) in cosmology is the measurement of the Hubble parameter reported
in Freedman et al. (1994); Pierce et al. (1994) and summarized in Jaffe (1996), that gave a more
specific and high range h > 0.7. This, along with flatness imposed by the theory of inflation created
a short spell of age problem, which required a Λ-term for its solution. But a nonzero Λ was always
behind the curtains and hence its appearance was not conceived to be a major deviation in the
standard model scenario. But then came the Type Ia supernovae (SNe Ia) data (Perlmutter et
al. 1999; Riess et al. 1998), which required the presence of a Λ-term large enough to cause an
accelerated expansion. The most recent release of SNe data (Tonry et al. 2003; Knop et al. 2003;
Riess et al. 2004) prompts many cosmologists even to speculate that some extremely unphysical
energy densities, such as those with w < −1 in the equation of state p = wρ, are required to explain
the data. Though this change was gradual, what happened here is a U-turn from the standpoint of
the early nineties, since the dynamics, energy content, equation of state, etc. of the universe have
now become totally speculative. But this is typical of every learning process and cannot be termed
unscientific.
It has long been recognized that the application of Bayes’s theorem in physical problems repre-
sents learning. [For a recent review, see D’Agostini (2003).] This theorem tells us how to adjust our
plausibility assumptions regarding a hypothesis when our state of knowledge changes through the
acquisition of new data. Classical mathematicians such as Bernoulli, Bayes, Laplace and Gauss have
found Bayes theorem useful in problems such as those in astronomy, thanks to its ability to learn.
Later, because of difficulties with assigning prior probabilities (which were mistakenly considered
to be purely subjective expressions of a person’s opinions about hypotheses), Bayes’s probability
theory has gone out of favor in physical sciences and was replaced by the more apparently objec-
tive ‘frequentist’ approach. But the realization that the frequentist definition of probability is as
subjective as the Bayesian has called forth a re-examination of this controversy. If some simple
desideratum such as ‘equivalent states of knowledge should be represented by equivalent probabil-
ity assignments’ (which is termed as Jaynes’s consistency) is followed, the Bayesian approach will
help to quantify the collective wisdom of scientists and hence can be made less subjective. When
compared to the improper application of frequentist probability theory, the Bayesian approach is
most powerful in problems such as those in cosmology, where the process of learning and also the
quantification and readjustment of plausibility assessments by the scientific community are very
important.
The apparent magnitude-redshift (m − z) data of SNe Ia are the only qualitative signature
of an accelerated expansion and hence it is very important in understanding the dynamics of the
universe. This accelerated expansion is confirmed (John 2004), provided there are no evolutionary
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effects for SNe (Drell et al. 2000). For analyzing the data, we need an expression for the scale
factor a(t). If the attempt is to obtain a(t) as the solution of Einstein equation, one must know
the energy densities present in the universe and also their equations of state. But here the data
indicate that known forms of energies are unable to account for it. Under such circumstances, the
use of the traditional Friedmann solutions of the scale factor a(t) obtained by assuming the presence
of known energies in cosmological problems, and particularly in the analysis of SNe data, can be
very misleading. Hence these SNe data are to be analyzed cosmographically, without making any
specific assumptions on the energy densities in the universe. Such an analysis of SNe data in John
(2004) assumes only homogeneity and isotropy for the universe; i.e., the universe is assumed to
have a Robertson-Walker (RW) metric. The scale factor of the universe can most naturally be
expanded into a Taylor series in t about the present epoch and we attempt to find its coefficients
from observation, as it was done to evaluate the Hubble parameter and deceleration parameter
in the original cosmographic approach (Weinberg 1972). Terms up to fifth-order were kept in
the above series and it was assumed that they make a good approximation. The results of this
and other analyses of SNe data do not give reason to believe that there were only standard model
energy densities or even any other energies with equation of state of the form p = wρ in the present
universe. Instead, the likelihoods for the various expansion rates obtained in our calculation are
very broadly peaked and these indicate that there are a variety of choices for the energy densities
in the present epoch. The Taylor series expansion approach is extended to third-order and fourth-
order in Sahni et al. (2003) and Visser (2004), respectively. Also Daly & Djorgovski (2003);
Wang & Mukherjee (2003); Daly & Djorgovski (2004) have attempted similar model-independent
analyses of SNe data.
When ensembles and repeated experiments are not possible, a natural and useful procedure in
cosmology is to compare how best different models can account for the data, using the Bayesian
method. In Bayesian model comparison, one computes odds ratios between different models. Jaffe
(1996) and Hobson et al. (2002) have used Bayesian theory to test the relative merits of different
cosmological models. In one such application of this technique, John & Narlikar (2002) have
compared the standard and inflationary models having nonzero Λ with a new simple model having
the scale factor a(t) ∝ t. This comparison was made using the SNe data set in Perlmutter et al.
(1999) and by assuming flat priors. Flat priors indicate that we are having no prior information
regarding parameters of the models except that they lie in some fiducial range. In the present
case, this is equivalent to stating that one depends only on the present SNe data for making the
comparison. In John & Narlikar (2002), it was found that the then available apparent magnitude-
redshift data alone were not very much discriminatory between these different models. However,
to be true to the spirit of Bayesian theory, our plausibility assignments should be updated with the
acquisition of new data. In this paper, we attempt to do this, by using the recent release of SNe
data.
Another important question we try to answer in this paper is whether the data really endorse
that the universe was decelerating in the past. For this, a model with some decelerating phase in
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the past is compared with another model having no such phase, by using the Bayesian approach.
In both cases, we assume the present universe to be accelerating. It is claimed that this method of
comparison is more robust than other investigations seeking evidence for a decelerating past since
both the Bayesian and cosmographic approaches mentioned above are used here. As mentioned
earlier, the scale factor is expanded into a fifth-order polynomial in time (fifth-order is required for
sufficient accuracy) and then the combinations of various coefficients in this expansion were sep-
arated into those which correspond only to acceleration during the entire period and those which
had at least some decelerating phase in this period. Considering these as rival models, the Bayes
factor is calculated. As an example of the Bayesian model comparison technique, we compare the
general relativistic and Newtonian explanations of deflection of light by sun, to show how powerful
is the available observed data on deflection of light in discriminating these explanations. We argue
that, in contrast to this case, the SNe data are not capable of discriminating the “always acceler-
ating” and “decelerating in the past” cosmological models. The results have serious implications
for modern theoretical cosmology for it is almost entirely built on the firm belief that the universe
was decelerating in the past.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the general formalism of Bayesian model
comparison employed here is given. The question of whether there was a decelerating past for the
universe is discussed in section 3. Comparison of some Friedmann cosmological models is discussed
in section 4 and section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2. BAYESIAN MODEL COMPARISON
The Bayes’s theorem helps to evaluate the posterior (i.e., after analyzing the data) probability
p(Hi|D, I) for a hypothesis Hi given the data D and the truth of some background information I,
as
p(Hi|D, I) =
p(Hi|I)p(D|Hi, I)
p(D|I)
. (1)
p(Hi|I) is called the prior (i.e., before analyzing the data) probability and is the probability for Hi,
given the truth of I alone. p(D|Hi, I) is the probability for obtaining the data D if the hypothesis
Hi and I were true and is called the likelihood for the hypothesis. The factor in the denominator
serves the purpose of normalization.
In Bayesian model comparison, one finds the odds ratios; i.e., the ratios between the posterior
probabilities for different models. If we have to compare rival models Mi and Mj, take the truths
of these as the hypotheses Hi and Hj , respectively and write, using Bayes’s theorem,
p(Mi|D, I)
p(Mj |D, I)
=
p(Mi|I)p(D|Mi, I)
p(Mj|I)p(D|Mj , I)
≡ Oij . (2)
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To some extent, evaluating the prior probability is subjective, since it depends only on the
prior information I and this may vary from person to person. But Bayesians view this theory as
an attempt to quantify the collective wisdom of researchers working in the field and hence finding
fiducial prior probabilities would be highly rewarding. However, if the information I does not prefer
one model over the other, the prior probabilities get cancel out and the odds ratio is simply
Oij =
p(D|Mi, I)
p(D|Mj , I)
≡ Bij. (3)
As mentioned above, the probability p(D|Mi, I) for the data D, given that the model Mi and
I are true, is called the likelihood for the model Mi and is denoted as L(Mi). For parameterized
models, with parameters α, β, .., this quantity can be evaluated as
p(D|Mi, I) ≡ L(Mi) =
∫
dα
∫
dβ...p(α, β, ...|Mi)Li(α, β, ...), (4)
where p(α, β, ...|Mi) is the prior probability for the set of parameter values α, β, .. and Li(α, β, ...)
is the likelihood for the combination. The latter quantity is often taken to be
Li(α, β, ...) = exp
[
−χ2i (α, β, ..)/2
]
, (5)
where
χ2 = Σk
(
Aˆk −Ak(α, β, ..)
σk
)2
(6)
is the χ2-statistic. Here Aˆk are the measured values of the observable A, Ak(α, β, ..) are its expected
values (from theory) and σk are the uncertainties in the measurement of the observable.
In a certain volume V of the parameter space, one can assign flat prior probability for all the
parameters by taking p(α, β, ...|Mi) = constant throughout this volume. When normalized, this
prior is simply 1/V . In those special cases where there are no adjustable parameters in the model,
we have δ-function prior and from equations (4) and (5),
L(Mi) = exp(−χ
2
i /2). (7)
Bij in equation (3) is referred to as the Bayes factor. The interpretation of this quantity is as
follows (Drell et al. 2000): If 1 < Bij < 3, there is evidence against model Mj , but it is not worth
more than a bare mention. If 3 < Bij < 20, this evidence is positive. If 20 < Bij < 150, it is strong
and if Bij > 150, the evidence is very strong.
To appreciate the significance of this interpretation of the Bayes factor, let us compare the
general relativistic and Newtonian explanations of the deflection of a light ray that just grazes the
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sun’s surface. The theoretical prediction made by general relativity (M1) in this case is θ0 = 1.75
′′
whereas in the purely Newtonian case (M2), it is θ0 = 0.875
′′. If we use the data θˆ0 = 1.98± 0.16
′′
obtained from the classic 1919 eclipse expedition to the island of Sobral (Dyson et al. 1920a,b),
the Bayes factor calculated using equations (3)-(7) above is B12 ∼ 10
10. It may be noted that the
χ2-values and hence the Bayes factor crucially depend on the error bars. Though the error bars
in the above case are now felt to be grossly underestimated, this published data took the world
by storm in favor of GR in 1919 and the reason can be understood from the huge value of B12
we obtained above. If all the 9 observational data points provided with error bars in Table 8.1 of
Weinberg (1972) were used, one gets B12 ∼ 10
82, a spectacularly large value for the Bayes factor to
settle the issue in favor of general relativity. These kinds of results are common in tests of quantum
theory too. These examples show that the above requirement Bij > 150 for an evidence to be very
strong is really modest.
3. ACCELERATING VS. DECELERATING PAST
We compare models of an always accelerating universe from time t0 + Tp to the present (t0 is
the present time and Tp is negative) with those which were decelerating for at least some time in
this period. Computations were performed for various values of Tp ranging from −1 × 10
17 s to
−5× 1017 s, the absolute value of the latter (≈ 15 Gyr) being usually quoted as the upper limit for
the age of the universe.
In John (2004), it was assumed that the scale factor of the universe can be approximated
by a fifth-order polynomial in time. With the present value of the scale factor as a0, the present
deceleration parameter as q0, and the present values of other parameters related to higher order
derivatives as r0, s0 and u0, this expression for a(t) is
a(t0 + T ) = a0
[
1 +H0T −
q0H
2
0
2!
T 2 +
r0H
3
0
3!
T 3 −
s0H
4
0
4!
T 4 +
u0H
5
0
5!
T 5
]
≡ a0
[
1 + a(1)T + a(2)T
2 + a(3)T
3 + a(4)T
4 + a(5)T
5
]
. (8)
In addition to the above parameters, we have k = 0,±1, which is the curvature constant
appearing in the RW metric and M , the absolute luminosity of SNe. The parameters a0 and M
have reasonable flat priors for a0 > 3000 Mpc and −19.6 < M < −19.1 magnitudes, respectively.
The upper bound for a0 is chosen as 8000 Mpc, large enough to incorporate spatially flat models.
Consequently, k = 0 need not be included in the calculations. In John (2004), marginal likelihoods
were evaluated for other parameters and found that the contributing ranges are 0.6 < h < 0.8,
−2 < q0 < 1, −15 < r0 < 15, −65 < s0 < 65, and −150 < u0 < 150. However, some combination
of these parameter values were found to give no solution to the equation 1 + z = a(t0)/a(t0 + T )
even for a time as past as T = −10× 1017 and those values were excluded.
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In the Bayesian model comparison to find evidence for a decelerating past for the universe
using new data, one should accept the above ranges as the prior information obtained from the
previous analysis. However, a modification is suggested to the effect that we shall begin by accepting
the present universe to be accelerating; i.e., q0 < 0. Considering the various other cosmological
observations and the general perception among cosmologists, it is only reasonable to include this
into the information I we have, before analyzing the present data. The two hypotheses we want to
compare may now be explicitly stated: (1) The universe is always accelerating from time t0 + Tp
to the present epoch (model M1) and (2) There is at least one decelerating epoch for the universe
during this period (model M2). The factors p(α, β, ..|Mi) in equation (4), which are the prior
probabilities for the parameters (given the truth of the respective models), are taken in this case
to be the flat probabilities 1/V1 and 1/V2 for models M1 and M2, respectively, where V1 and V2 are
the volumes in the parameter space corresponding to each of them. For any particular combination
of parameter values, a sure test for the occurrence of deceleration during Tp < T < 0 is to plot
a¨(t0 + T ) = a0[2a(2) + 6a(3)T + 12a(4)T
2 + 20a(5)T
3] (9)
for this interval and to see whether it becomes negative at any time during the period. The Bayes
factor is then
B12 =
(1/V1)Σk
∫
V1
exp(−χ21/2)da0 dh dq0 dr0 ds0 du0 dM
(1/V2)Σk
∫
V2
exp(−χ22/2)da0 dh dq0 dr0 ds0 du0 dM
. (10)
Here, χ2 for a model is calculated using equation (6), with the replacement of A by m, the apparent
magnitude of the SN and the parameters α, β, .. are a0, h, q0, r0, s0, u0, M , and k. The expression
for m to be used is
m = 5 log
D
1Mpc
+ 25 +M. (11)
D/1Mpc refers to the luminosity distance D = r1a0(1+z), expressed in megaparsecs. The comoving
coordinate r1 can be found from
∫ 0
T1
c dT
a(t0 + T )
=
∫ r1
0
dr
1− kr2
≡ S−1k (r1), (12)
where t1 = t0+T1 is the time at which an SN at r1 emits the light and S
−1
k (r1) is equal to sin
−1(r1)
for k = +1, and sinh−1(r1) for k = −1.
An important part of the calculation is the solution of the following equation, used to find
T1 in terms of z, for each combination of parameter values. This is done in a direct and purely
numerical way [and differently from the way it was done in John (2004)]:
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1 + z =
a(t0)
a(t0 + T1)
=
1
1 + a(1)T1 + a(2)T
2
1 + a(3)T
3
1 + a(4)T
4
1 + a(5)T
5
1
. (13)
Another improvement is that this numerical solution for T1 is found with the more reliable regula
falsi method, rather than the Newton-Raphson method employed in the above paper. As a con-
sequence of these modifications, r1 has to be obtained by numerical integration in equation (12).
Though it now requires more computation time, these changes have made the analysis free of the
truncations that weakened the approximations for certain parameters in the previous case. No
point in the parameter space is now left out for the reason of breaking down of the approximations.
As mentioned earlier, the only points left out are those which do not have a solution for equation
(13) for all z in the data set, even for the past 1018s. They are not included in the volumes V1
and V2 either. The values of the Bayes factor obtained for various values of Tp are tabulated in
Table 1. The values obtained while using the 54 “All SCP” SNe (data D1) in Knop et al. (2003)
(as reproduced in John (2004)) and the 157 “gold” data points (data D2) in Riess et al. (2004),
respectively are given in two separate columns. It may also be noted that while using D2, one does
not have to include the parameter M in the calculations since the data give m−M , the distance
modulus in place of m.
The envelopes of the marginal likelihoods for parameters obtained in John (2004) using D1
were found to be mostly unchanged. However, it can be seen that the afore-said modifications have
made significant improvement in the quality of the curves and for the purpose of verification, the
new likelihoods for h, q0, r0, s0, and u0 are given here in Figures 1-5. The fluctuations have now
disappeared and we have very smooth curves. These likelihoods were computed for ranges wider
than the ones in the previous case, but the prior ranges for these parameters remained the same
(information I) in the computations of Bayes factors and other marginal likelihoods.
The results show that except in the case of using data D2 for Tp = −2× 10
17s, there is hardly
any evidence for a decelerating phase in the past 15 Gyrs. All the other Bayes factors in the
table are slightly greater than unity and this shows that if at all there is evidence, it is in favor
of an always accelerating universe during this period. However, in sharp contrast to the model
comparison exercise using data of light deflection by sun (discussed in sec. 2), here the evidences
are too weak and hence it is safer to conclude that the data are unable to discriminate these two
hypotheses.
4. COMPARISON OF SOME FRIEDMANN MODELS
In this section, we use the method of model comparison to some Friedmann cosmological
models. The popular models compared are (1) the Friedmann-Lamaitre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW)
model (ModelM1) having a Robertson-Walker (RW) metric with k = ±1, 0, which contains ordinary
matter and a “constant” cosmological constant and (2) the same FLRW model but with inflation,
which implies a k = 0 RW metric (Model M2). A comparison between these two models itself is an
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Fig. 1.— The marginal likelihood for h.
Fig. 2.— The marginal likelihood for q0.
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Fig. 3.— The marginal likelihood for the parameter r0.
Fig. 4.— The marginal likelihood for the parameter s0.
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interesting problem, even though the SNe data do not contain direct imprints of inflation, except
through its prediction of flat space sections or the equivalent condition Ωm +ΩΛ = 1.
Another model (Model M3) we compare with the above is a Friedmann model having the
simplest evolution with time; i.e., the one whose scale factor a(t) ∝ t throughout the history of the
universe. This kind of a coasting evolution can be arrived at in a number of ways. The quantity
ρ+ 3p, where we denote the total energy density as ρ and the total pressure of the universe as p,
is sometimes called the gravitational charge. In all Friedmann models, if the gravitational charge
vanishes, the evolution is coasting. Another approach is to generalize a dimensional argument
by Chen and Wu to deduce that the energy densities in the universe, which are not separately
conserved, vary as a−2(t) (John & Babu Joseph 2000). In this case too, a coasting evolution
follows. In the above paper, it was noted that when we consider the universe as containing more
than one component, eg., matter/radiation and Λ, the coasting model has a unique feature in which
it predicts a ratio between the density parameters; Ωm/ΩΛ = 2/(1 + 3w) (w = 0 or 1/3). Hence
it has no coincidence problem. It was shown that this model is devoid of other problems like the
horizon, flatness, monopole, size, age of the universe and the generation of density perturbations
on scales well above the present Hubble radius in the classical epoch. An added advantage is that
here one can consider the generation of the observed density perturbations as a late-time classical
behavior too. The solution of the coincidence, age and density perturbation problems deserve
special mention since these problems are not solvable in an inflationary scenario. It was also shown
that the evolution of temperature in the model is nearly the same as that in the standard big bang
model and this will enable nucleosynthesis to proceed in an identical manner, provided the total
density parameter Ω ≈ 2. In John & Narlikar (2002), the afore-said condition was stated to be a
problem with model M3.
The above coasting evolution can also be obtained by a quite different route (John & Babu
Joseph 1996, 1997). Here we consider the analytic continuation of a real analytic manifold (the
spacetime) into the complex, producing a complex spacetime. There are a number of instances of
the use of complex numbers or complex analytic functions in general theory of relativity (Flaherty
1980; Newman 1988). This model is arrived at by extending the idea of a possible ‘signature
change’ in the universe (Ellis et al. 1992; Mars et al. 2001), a widely discussed speculation which
involves some basic issues in the general relativity. This extension leaves us in an unphysical
universe, but it was noticed that a proper interpretation of the theory will enable us to obtain
a cosmological model, with the essential features as summarized above. The evolution of a(t) is
obtained as a2(t) = a2min + c
2t2 and a quantum cosmological calculation shows that amin ∼ lp, the
Planck length. Thus after the Planck epoch, a ∝ t and the evolution is the same as in the above
case. In addition to the above advantages, this approach solves the singularity problem too.
However, the analysis in this paper is intended to provide and improve an example of Bayesian
model comparison (John & Narlikar 2002) and the coasting model is suitable for this purpose
due to its simplicity. This model is not a realistic one since it requires some more fundamental
derivation such as that in the scalar field dark energy models. As in the previous work, we assume
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that the model is given and then proceed with the evaluation.
One observes that when the Bayes factor is near unity, the prior odds p(Mi|I)/p(Mj |I) in
equation (2) becomes very important. While comparing models M1, M2, and M3, it was observed
in the above paper that whereas models M1 and M2 are plagued by the large number of cos-
mological problems, M3 suffers from the heuristic nature of its derivation and the problem with
nucleosynthesis, as mentioned earlier. But one can argue that the inclusion of a small Λ in the
present universe in models M1 and M2 itself is done heuristically. However, a balance was set
between the prior probabilities and these models were compared with prior odds equal to unity.
The results thus obtained in the previous work, while using the m− z data (Perlmutter et al. 1999)
for comparison were B13 ≈ 3.1 and B23 ≈ 5 and the conclusion made was that there is some but
not strong evidence against model M3.
The data used in the present analysis are the same as those used in the calculations in the
previous section. The parameters in the models are H0, M , Ωm and ΩΛ. But in M2 and M3, their
numbers are effectively reduced by one each, due to the conditions Ωm + ΩΛ = 1 and Ωm/ΩΛ =
2/(1 + 3w) (w = 0 or 1/3), respectively, in these models. While using data D1, one can consider
H0 and M as a single parameter by suitably combining them, but while using data D2, we do
not need to include M . However, in the present analysis using D1, we consider H0 and M as
independent parameters, as we did in section 3 and they are assumed to have flat priors in the
ranges 0.6 < h < 0.8 and −19.6 < M < −19.1, respectively. This is a modification of the procedure
in John & Narlikar (2002), but this alone does not affect the results in any way. Since the data
consist of several common SNe and many of them are refined values of those used in the above
paper, we decide to make their analysis independently of the one in that work. However, the
information I we have regarding the ranges of Ωm and ΩΛ are modified on the basis of the previous
results. The new ranges chosen are 0 < Ωm < 1 and 0 < ΩΛ < 1. One can see that small variations
in these ranges do not affect our conclusions drastically.
The luminosity distance D in these cases can generally be written as D = (c/H0)d(z; Ωm,ΩΛ).
Thus the apparent magnitude is m = 5 log(c/H0) + 5 log d(z; Ωm,ΩΛ) + 25 +M . The expression
for d to be used for M1 and M2 is
d = 5 log{(1 + z) |Ωk|
−1/2Sk[|Ωk|
1/2I(z)]},
where Ωk = 1−Ωm−ΩΛ and Sk(x) = sinx for Ωm+ΩΛ > 1, Sk(x) = sinhx for Ωm +ΩΛ < 1 and
Sk(x) = x for Ωm +ΩΛ = 1. Also
I(z) =
∫ z
0
[(1 + z′)2(1 + Ωmz
′)− z′(2 + z′)(ΩΛ)]
−1/2 dz′.
For Model 3, the function d can be written as
d = 5 log{m(1 + z)Sk[
1
m
ln(1 + z)]},
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where m =
√
2k/(3Ωm − 2) for the nonrelativistic era and Sk(x) = sinx for Ωm > 2/3, Sk(x) =
sinhx for Ωm < 2/3 and Sk(x) = x for Ωm = 2/3.
The Bayes factors are evaluated as in the previous section and the results obtained in the
present analysis are tabulated in Table 2. These show that the FLRW and inflationary models are
at a more advantageous position than in John & Narlikar (2002), as per the interpretation of the
Bayes factor.
5. DISCUSSION
Our attempt in this paper is to apply the Bayesian model comparison method to some vexing
problems in cosmology in the light of latest m − z data of SNe Ia. These data are the results of
potential landmark observations in cosmology, after the discovery of the Hubble’s law. Since they
point to an accelerating universe today, it is natural to ask for how long the universe remained in
this phase. The Bayesian analysis shows that except in one case, there is no evidence from SNe
data to conclude that a changeover from deceleration to acceleration occurred anywhere in the past
5× 1017 s.
But a rider we add to the above conclusion is even more important. The odds ratios between
‘always accelerating’ and ‘decelerating’ models in the given period, with impartial prior odds, are
obtained to be close to unity, and that too in favor of the former model in most cases. However,
as per the interpretation of this ratio, it is highly objectionable to state that one or the other of
the models analyzed is ruled out, when it is on the basis of obtaining this ratio close to unity.
To highlight this point, the model comparison exercise was performed to one of the classic tests
of general relativity, viz., the deflection of light by sun, as it just grazes the sun’s surface. The
huge value of the odds ratio (more strictly, the Bayes factor, since the prior odds was taken to
be unity) obtained tells us how the Newtonian explanation of this phenomenon is ruled out by
this observation. One can see that epoch-making discoveries are always accompanied by such large
values for the Bayes factor. We wish anybody who claims that some particular model is ‘ruled out’
by some data to take note of this fact. Bayesian theory also teaches the important lesson that the
price for overlooking this fact would be unavoidable and frequent U-turns. The present analysis
rules out neither the accelerating nor the decelerating models; instead, we safely conclude that the
data cannot discriminate these models.
The present analysis makes use of a significant improvement in the cosmographic approach
adopted in John (2004). In order to overcome the problem of truncations in the series for 1/a(t)
used in the equation 1+z = a0/a(t) in the previous work, the solution of this equation is performed
here in a purely numerical way. Though this consumes more computation time, it is advantageous
that the accuracy is not compromised. As a consequence of the above modification, we had to
perform a numerical integration in the expression for r1. Though these amount to application
of brute force in the analysis, the procedure has become much transparent. When compared to
– 14 –
our own and other model-independent analyses of SNe data carried out previously (mentioned
in the introduction), the present one is simpler and uses the least amount of clumsy formulas
and this makes the treatment more intelligible. The procedure also makes use of the marginal
likelihood method in the analysis. Since we are basically interested in the coefficients in the series
expansion and the odds ratio, it is better to keep the treatment simple, to ensure accuracy at every
stage. Considerable enhancement in such accuracy can be noticed from the plots of new marginal
likelihoods for h, q0, r0 s0,and u0 (shown in Figs. 1-5, respectively, which are drawn using the data
D1), when compared with the corresponding curves in John (2004).
It may be recalled that the likelihood for the model L(Mi) computed using equation (4) is in
fact the probability for the data, given the model and I are true and is not exactly the ‘probability
for the model’. Similarly, in the Bayesian scheme, the marginal likelihood for a parameter is not
to be considered as the probability distribution for the parameter. However, we have computed
the mean and σ values from the above marginal likelihoods. Their new values are h = 0.68± 0.06,
q0 = −0.90± 0.65, r0 = 2.7± 6.7, s0 = 36.5± 52.9, and u0 = 142.7± 320. The large σ-values show
that indeed there are a variety of choices for the values of the parameters, which may be considered
as ‘good fit’ in the conventional way.
As stated earlier, the χ2-values and hence the Bayes factor crucially depend on the error bars.
The fact that the data cannot clearly discriminate different models in cosmology implies that the
error bars in the data are quite large. Hopefully, future observations will have sufficiently small
errors so that the Bayes factor between different models may become large. But some important
points one should check in such cases is whether the errors are truly Gaussianly distributed and
also whether we know accurately the standard deviation of these errors. Any deviation from these
conditions will affect the validity of the model comparison. In cases where we are not sure about
these two assumptions, one can resort to some other version of probability theory; for instance, the
median statistics advocated by Gott, III et al. (2001) for analyzing cosmological datasets. These
examples demonstrate how important are detailed considerations of the underlying assumptions in
making judgments on what the data tells in cosmology.
It should be admitted that the Taylor expansion of the scale factor has more parameters to be
constrained than realistic models and thereby it weakens the power of the data. But the cosmo-
graphic approach, which is basically a kinematic one, is not an alternative to realistic cosmological
models. Instead, it helps to consolidate the evidences for such models. For example, evaluating the
expansion parameters like h, q0, r0, s0, etc. will help to constrain these models, as in the traditional
use of the values of h and q0. It is also of use in answering questions like how long into the past
the accelerating phase prevailed, as we have attempted to do in this paper. When we have more
terms in the Taylor expansion, our extrapolation into the past becomes more accurate. Truncating
at the fifth-order is due to practical considerations. Adding one more term would increase the
computation time at least by an order of magnitude. We have seen that for extrapolating to the
past corresponding to z ≈ 1.75, up to fifth-order term in the expansion is required.
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In this paper, we have also performed the comparison between some Friedmann models such
as FLRW, inflationary and coasting models. This is viewed as an extension of a previous work
using new and refined data. This analysis uses the previous one in modifying the flat priors. We
use flat priors for the parameters Ωm and ΩΛ in the intervals 0 < Ωm < 1 and 0 < ΩΛ < 1. The
Bayes factors show that when data D1 is used, the FLRW and inflationary models are at par with
each other, and there is positive evidence against the coasting models. But in the case of using
D2, when compared to the the first model, there is some evidence against the inflationary one and
a strong evidence against the coasting one. Also when compared to inflationary models, there is a
positive evidence against the coasting model. But we again recall that these evidences are not very
strong to rule out any of them. It is also to be noted that there is no contradiction between the two
analyses in sections 3 and 4. The results in the latter section simply states that when compared to
models M1 and M2, which are largely accelerating, the non-accelerating model M3 is disfavored.
Thus the evaluation of Bayes factor helps to quantify our knowledge, even when we are not aware
of the full story.
These lessons are important in keeping cosmology a science. So far in the history of physics,
though there were scientific revolutions, we always find that the new theories contain the old ones
as limiting cases. This is because experimental evidences do not contradict the older theories in
the realms in which they are applicable. For example, in a laboratory experiment where general
relativistic effects are negligible, the Bayes factor between Newtonian and Einsteinian theories
will be close to unity. Our results show that cosmological observations have not yet passed this
stage and it is our opinion that the claims in cosmology, including the old and new ones we have
compared in this paper, are not convincing enough since they are not supported by satisfactorily
large Bayes factors. In physics we also see that in the realms where new theories are indispensable,
they make unambiguous predictions, which are then verified experimentally. It can be seen that
in such cases, new theories are often supported by huge Bayes factors, as in the example of light
deflection discussed above in this paper. To achieve such goals in cosmology, we should tread with
caution, begin with the cosmographic approach since it is the most fundamental one, and Bayes
theory will help us to look for hard evidences. We have made such an attempt in this paper and
the main conclusion, which is consistent with other approaches, is that the available data cannot
clearly discriminate the cosmological models analyzed.
The author wishes to thank the UGC for a Research Grant and IUCAA, Pune, where part of
this work was done, for hospitality.
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Fig. 5.— The marginal likelihood for the parameter u0.
Table 1: Bayes Factors between ”Always Ac-
celerating” and ”Decelerating” Cosmological
Models during the past.
Tp s B12 using Data D1 B12 using Data D2
−1× 1017 3.3 1.1
−2× 1017 1.5 0.6
−3× 1017 2 1.1
−4× 1017 2.4 1.6
−5× 1017 2.8 2.1
Table 2: Bayes Factors between Fried-
mann Models Ma1 , M
b
2 , and M
c
3 .
Bayes Factor Using Data D1 Using Data D2
B12 0.9 1.8
B13 12 27.5
B23 13.4 15.3
a: M1- FLRW model with matter and a cosmological
constant.
b: M2- The same as M1, but with inflation (Ωm +
ΩΛ = 1).
c: M3- Coasting model.
